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Abstract—Classical PIN-entry methods are vulnerable to a
broad class of observation attacks (shoulder surfing, key-logging).
A number of alternative PIN-entry methods that are based on
human cognitive skills have been proposed. These methods can
be classified into two classes regarding information available to a
passive adversary: (i) the adversary fully observes the entire input
and output of a PIN-entry procedure, and (ii) the adversary can
only partially observe the input and/or output.
In this paper we propose a novel PIN-entry scheme - Shoulder
Surfing Safe Login (SSSL). SSSL is a challenge response protocol
that allows a user to login securely in the presence of the
adversary who can observe (via key-loggers, cameras) user input.
This is accomplished by restricting the access to SSSL challenge
values. Compared to existing solutions, SSSL is both user-friendly
(not mentally demanding) and cost efficient. Our usability study
reveals that the average login time with SSSL is around 8 sec in a
5-digit PIN scenario. We also show the importance of considering
side-channel timing attacks in the context of authentication
schemes based on human cognitive skills.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) are widely used in
modern information systems to authenticate users. Unfortu-
nately, classical PIN-entry methods (via keyboards, keypads
and alike) are all vulnerable to observation attacks. By simply
observing the input of a user who enters his/her PIN, an adver-
sary can potentially compromise the user’s login credentials.
There are numerous ways to perpetrate an observation attack.
Thus, it is possible to obtain login information by shoulder
surfing, through the use of concealed micro cameras and
telescopes [2]. By installing keyloggers and fake keypads an
adversary can easily collect the entire input of a targeted user,
from which the adversary can recover the login credentials.
Another interesting attack directed at the keypad would be
to spray suitable chemicals onto the keypad, from which
an adversary may recover user input [3]. The problem of
observation attacks is further amplified by widespread of
computing devices and services requiring login credentials,
such as laptops, PDAs, mobile phones, ATMs, e-banking and
e-commerce applications, etc.
This threat has long been recognized and prior work con-
tains a variety of proposals for attempting to deal with it. Many
proposals require the user to perform some form of a cognitive
task - so called cognitive authentication schemes. The problem
of designing a cognitive PIN-entry method secure against
eavesdroppers is truly challenging. Indeed, it was recently
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shown in [5] that the cognitive scheme proposed in [23] and
all its variants are fundamentally vulnerable to attacks based
on SAT solver. It is an open question if there exist a PIN-entry
scheme resistant against active attacks [9].
We can divide existing PIN-entry methods roughly in two
classes regarding information available to an adversary: (i)
the adversary fully observes the entire input and output of a
PIN-entry procedure, and (ii) the adversary can only partially
observe the input and/or output. For example, the PIN-entry
method [9] belongs to the first class (fully observable). In this
method all information exchanged between the user and the
interrogator is available to the adversary. Unfortunately, this
fact significantly increases the amount of cognitive effort for
the user. On the other hand, the PIN-entry method [26] falls
in the second class (partially observable). In this method,
the user receives a challenge via a protected channel, and
enters the response via a public keypad. Method Shoulder
Surfing Safe Login (SSSL) that we propose in this paper
is inspired by the work in [26]. Like the method in [26],
SSSL also involves a protected channel through which a
user receives challenges. However, unlike [26] SSSL does
not require users to perform any complicated mathematical
or mentally demanding operation (Section III).
The design choice to include the protected channel in our
scheme (SSSL) was motivated by the following observations
about the methods from the first class (the “fully observable”
model). Firstly, designing secure cognitive PIN-entry schemes
in the “fully observable” model is challenging as the SAT
solver attack show. Secondly, secure PIN-entry schemes from
this model involve multiple rounds of a basic challenge-
response protocol and they require users to perform compli-
cated mathematical calculations [9], which is a major deterrent
to the acceptance of such technology (an average time of about
166 seconds in [9]).
The SSSL PIN-entry scheme implements the one-time pad
paradigm. Thus, to enter a single digit of a secret PIN, a user
first receives a challenge (a random number between 1 and
9) from an interrogator (computer, ATM) over a channel that
ensures secrecy and integrity (e.g., via earphones). Next, the
user visually locates the received challenge in a special table
of digits displayed on his/her computer’s screen. Finally, the
user responds by clicking on the appropriate button (shown on
the computer’s screen) that uniquely links the secret challenge
with the secret digit of the PIN.
Our solution, Shoulder Surfing Safe Login, is simple, user-
friendly (not mentally demanding), cheap to implement and
allows fast authentication (i.e., the average login time is 8 sec
in the 5-digit PIN scenario - Section IV).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
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we discuss related work and give the attacker model along
with usability and design requirements. We describe our SSSL
method in Section III and provide the usability analysis in
Section IV. In Section V, we perform the security analysis of
SSSL. In Section VI we introduce to some possible applica-
tions of SSSL Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK, OBJECTIVES AND THREAT MODEL
In this section we summarize related research that motivates
our approach to the design of a secure login method. We
describe the pros and cons of other existing login methods.
Finally, we describe our objectives and the threat model used
in this work.
A. Existing PIN-entry Methods
There is a body of research focused on designing secure
PIN-entry methods in face of the threat posed by observation
attacks. As noted, we can divide existing PIN-entry methods
in two classes regarding information available to an adversary.
In one class the adversary fully observers the entire input
and output of the PIN-entry procedure - the fully observable
adversarial model. In the second class, the adversary can
only partially observe the input and/or output - the partially
observable adversarial model.
The basic difference between the two classes is that methods
developed for the partially observable model usually involve
some nonstandard, expensive or hard-to-use hardware [18],
[20], [26]. At the same time, designing secure PIN-entry
methods appears to be much easier in this model. Indeed,
disregarding the threat of side-channel attacks that is common
to both classes (Section V), we are not aware of any passive
attack targeted at methods designed in the partially observable
model. On the other hand, methods from the first class are
purely software-based solutions [3], [4], [17], [27], [19], [23],
[25], [24]. However, designing a method secure even against
a simple passive attacks in the fully observable model appears
to be challenging [19], [23], [5].
1) PIN-entry in the Fully Observable Model: Passive At-
tack on the PIN-entry scheme. To defeat observation attacks
Roth et. al. propose a novel PIN-entry method [19]. Let us
assume that a user wants to enter ith digit of his/her secret
PIN. The main idea is to present the user two disjoint sets
Si,b and Si,w of PIN digits layed out on a regular PIN pad,
by randomly coloring half of the keys black (b) and the other
half white (w). To enter ith digit of his/her secret PIN, the
user has to enter in which set (Si,b or Si,w) the PIN digit is.
Then, the sets are shuffled and another round is played. After
couple of rounds (e.g., 4) the ATM can determine the entered
PIN digit unambiguously by intersecting the sets chosen by
the user in each round, e.g.,
ith digit ∈ Si,b(1) ∩ Si,w(2) ∩ Si,w(3) ∩ Si,b(4) .
The same game is played for all PIN digits. This variant of
the method is secure against an adversary (characterized by a
short term memory) [19]. However, an observer who records
an entire session with a camera will be able to determine the
entered digit (PIN) by the same algorthm as the ATM.
For this reason, Roth et. al. propose a variant of the
basic method by reducing the number of rounds and thereby
introducing uncertainty about the entered PIN digits. Speaking
mathematically, in a single game with 3 rounds per digit we
have | ∩3t=1 Si,x(t)| > 1, where x(t) ∈ {b, w}. We call the set
∩3t=1Si,x(t)(k) the uncertainty set of the ith digit in the kth
game and denote it with Ui(k).
To recover the ith digit of the user’s PIN, the adversary will
observe k successful login sessions, in each session record
the sets Si,x(t)(k) (x(t) ∈ {b, w}, t = 1, 2, 3) and finally
calculate the uncertainty sets Ui(k), k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Finally,
by simply intersecting the sets Ui(k), k = 1, 2, . . . n, the ith
digit is trivially recovered. To estimate the number of games
(i.e., n) before the PIN digit can be recovered, we adopt
security parameters from [19] and assume that for each game
k = 1, 2, . . . , n we have |Ui(k)| = 3. Note that the uncertainty
sets |Ui(k)| (k = 1, 2) must not be identical, otherwise all
digits from these sets will be accepted as valid ith digit of the
PIN. On the other hand, any difference in the uncertainty sets
reduces their size by one element. Therefore, we can expect
to recover the valid ith digit after observing only 2-3 games
(successful logins).
Other solutions include user’s biometric information in the
process of the authentication. Thus, Malek et. al. [13] propose
to use a pressure as a binary input with graphical passwords.
Kumar et. al. [12] use a gaze based password entry where an
user enters a password or PIN by selecting from an on-screen
keyboard using only the orientation of their pupils. In Thorpe
et. al. [21] the user authenticates using a pass-thought system
where the user thinks of the password and by the electrodes
the system records and processes user’s brain signals. All of
those methods are based on an expensive hardware and we are
not aware of a simple attack model which targets them.
SAT-solver Based Attacks on Cognitive Schemes [5].
In Weinshall [23], an user mentally computes a path formed
by their portfolio images, and give an answer based on that
mentally computed path. Every response to challenge allows
to an adversary to learn a boolean relationship between the bits
of the users secret key. After observing only several successful
authentications, the adversary can reveal the key.
Matsumoto and Imai [15], Wang [22], and Matsumoto [14]
provides schemes which are generally vulnerable to an active
adversary or require the user to remember a large secret or
perform many calculations to achieve a large number of secure
authentications.
Next we briefly describe several purely-software based solu-
tions not specifically designed to be secure against observation
attacks.
Human cognition has been investigated with the goal to
enhance recall of passwords like images [4], or Passfaces [17].
In Blonder [3] and Wiedenbeck et. al. [24] the user clicks
on any place on the image to create a password, where
[24] allows using arbitrary images. The user authenticates
successfully clicking inside the tolerance around each chosen
pixel in the correct sequence.
In Passfaces [17] a user’s password is represented by a set
of pictures showing different human faces. To authenticate, the
user first receives a challenge in a form of a 3× 3 grid with 9
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randomly placed faces. The user selects the face that belongs to
his/her set of password faces. This challenge-response protocol
repeats several times and the user is successfully authenticated
if he/she correctly answers on all challenges. In a related
solution Deja Vu [4] pictures can show arbitrary content.
Finally, in the HB [9] scheme the human and the computer
share the secret binary vectors x and y of length n, where
|x| = |y| = k, that is x has k positions set to 1. The
HB authentication schemes involves multiple rounds (m) of
a basic challenge-response protocol. The authors themselves
concluded the method was not usable in practice since it took
166 seconds the average time per successful authentication.
2) PIN-entry in the Partially Observable Model: Kuber and
Yu [18] and Sasamoto et. al. [20] use a tactile channel as a
secure hidden challenge channel. In the first solution the user
is given a sequence of tactons to remember. To authenticate,
the user rolls with a mouse over nine blank squares on the
display causing an unique pattern appear under fingerprints.
In the second solution the user simultaneously receives a
visual challenge and a hidden tactile challenge via a protected
channel. To authenticate the user has to answer correctly to
several challenges. The common characteristics of the above
solutions is that they require non-standard (potentially hard to
use) hardware.
On the contrary, the solution described in the US patent [26]
is based on a standard hardware, in which the user receives a
challenge (a random number from 0, 1, . . . , 9) via a protected
audio channel, adds modulo 10 each digit of his genuine
PIN to the digits of the random number, and enters back the
outcome via public keypad. Unlike our SSSL, this solution
requires users to perform mathematical operations.
B. Security and Usability Objectives
1) Threat Model: We consider attacks by three types of
adversaries:
• A passive adversary who eavesdrops on all public com-
munication between the user and the end system. This
adversary will try to learn SSSL protected login creden-
tials by passively recoding the SSSL login procedure. The
passive adversary does not interact in any way with the
end system.
• An attacker who performs the side-channel timing attack.
This attacker extends the passive adversary with the
capability of recording the user’s reaction time during
the course of SSSL procedure by, for example, using key-
logging malware.
• An active adversary who is able to compromise the
system (an ATM or a computer) on which the user enters
his/her login credentials. In this scenario, the compro-
mised system (an ATM or a login computer) essentially
provides connectivity between the user and some trusted
end server (e.g., a banking server).
In Section V, we analyze the security of SSSL in the
above security model. We show that the SSSL can successfully
mitigate all the threats described above.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. SSSL interface: (a) In the SSSL table each digit i is an immediate
neighbor to the other 8 digits from the set {1, 2, . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , 9}; (b)
A user enters his/her response via 8 arrow buttons and one center button.
2) Usability and Design Requirements: We require a login
method to meet two additional objectives:
• User friendliness - a login method should be easy to
learn and use, not mentally demanding (it must not
require complex mathematical operations). This directly
translates to low login error rates and fast authentication
times (see Section IV).
• Cost-efficiency - a login method should be cheap to
implement. It should not involve expensive and/or non-
standardized hardware. Finally, it should be possible to
integrate it seamlessly with existing login systems and
solutions.
Our SSSL scheme meets all the above requirements. It is
secure in a realistic adversarial model - security, it does not
require mathematical computation on the part of the human
user - user-friendliness, and finally, it is cheap to implement
(not requiring the use of expensive and non-standardized
hardware) - cost-efficient.
III. SSSL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we first describe the basic SSSL scheme in
a PIN entry scenario, that is, in a scenario where the human
user enters a purely numerical secret.
A. Secure PIN-entry with SSSL
As mentioned in Section I, the SSSL scheme falls in the
second class of PIN-entry methods, i.e., it is designed to work
in the partially observable model where the adversary can only
partially observe the PIN-entry procedure. SSSL implements
the challenge-response paradigm and comprises three major
components: (i) a protected channel ensuring secrecy and
integrity of challenge values, (ii) an SSSL table - a table of
digits from 1 to 9 organized in such a way that each digit i
is an immediate neighbor to the other 8 digits from the set
{1, 2, . . . , 9} (Figure 1(a)), and (iii) a set of response buttons
(Figure 1(b)).
The SSSL method proceeds as follows. Let us assume that
a user wants to authenticate to a computer using the following
PIN: 46548. Let us denote the PIN digits as d0 = 4, d1 = 6,
d2 = 5, d3 = 4 and d4 = 8. The computer will display
the SSSL table and the response buttons on its screen as
shown in Figure 1. These two components of SSSL are public
(observable by an adversary). At time instant t0, the user will
receive a random challenge (one digit long) c0 selected from
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{1, . . . , 9}. Let us assume c0 = 9 in our example. The user
will receive the challenge over a protected channel (e.g., over
earphones plugged into the computer). We assume that the
adversary cannot learn this challenge (the partially observable
model). In Sections V we discuss different ways to implement
the protected channel (earphones) and we asses the security
of SSSL in different adversarial models. We show that it is
possible to implement such a protected channel in a way
completely transparent to the user, such that SSSL remains
secure even in the strong adversarial model (active attacks,
fake computers and ATMs, etc.). Getting back to our example.
The user looks up in the darker area of the SSSL table
(Figure 1(a)) and locates (visually) the first digit of his/her
PIN, d0 = 4. The user then locates (visually) the challenge
c0 = 9 in the immediate (one-hop) neighborhood of previously
located digit d0 = 4. Note that this is always possible, as the
digits in the SSSL table are arranged in such a way that each
digit i (located in the darker area) is an immediate neighbor to
all the other digits from the set {1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i + 1, . . . , 9}.
Finally, the user answers the challenge by clicking a response
button (Figure 1(b)) that shows the relative position of the
challenge c0 with respect to the corresponding PIN digit p0.
In our example, the user clicks the “south-west” arrow, that
is, he/she responds with r0 = ⇓. It is easily seen that
the response r0 unambiguously links the challenge with the
corresponding PIN digit. Note that adversary can observe the
user’s response r0.
At this stage the first PIN digit has been entered and the
whole procedure repeats for the remaining PIN digits. For
example, at time instant t1 > t0 the user receives the challenge
c1 = 6 to enter the PIN digit p1 = 6. Therefore, he/she
responds by clicking the center button (Figure 1(a)), that is,
r1 = ◦. The whole PIN-entry procedure is summarized in the
following table:
time t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
PIN 4 6 5 4 8
challenge values 9 6 2 1 6
user’s response ⇓ ◦ ⇑ ⇑ ⇑
Note that SSSL does not require any numerical computation
on the part of the human user. Moreover, the number of
challenge-response rounds equals the size of the PIN. It is
these two features that make the SSSL easy to use and very
user-friendly. We asses the security of the SSSL method in
Section V.
The size of the PIN space. The digits in the SSSL table
are arranged in a special way in order to ensure that each digit
i is an immediate neighbor to all the other digits from the set
{1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , 9}. The price that we have to pay
to accomplish this is the reduced PIN entropy. Indeed, in our
solution every PIN digit can take one out of 9 values compared
with one out of 10 in classical methods. In order to compensate
for this loss, we suggest using somewhat longer PINs. For
example, in our experiments each user has been given a 5
digits long PIN compared to 4 in classical solutions; note that
95 > 104. As we report in Section IV, this increase did not
affect significantly the usability of our scheme, as the average
login time was only 8 seconds. To the best of our knowledge,
Fig. 2. The web application used in the evaluation of the SSSL method.
no other secure PIN-entry method has such a short login time;
e.g., [20] reports 32 seconds for five personal images.
IV. USABILITY EVALUATION OF SSSL
We carried out an experiment in order to study different
usability aspects of the SSSL login method. In this section,
we present the results obtained from our evaluation study.
A. Evaluation Procedure
A total number of 30 participants took part in our evaluation
study in a PIN-entry scenario. All the participants involved
in the experiment were third year computer science students
(early 20s). At the end 15 participants completed the study,
with a dropout rate at 50%. This can be explained by two
factors: The experiment was voluntary and the students were
not paid or motivated to complete the study. The study took
part during the exams period where the study was not the
priority. In the experiment, each participant was asked to login
using SSSL at least once a day during the period of four weeks.
The participants were given a short (10 minute) tutorial on
the SSSL method before the beginning of their authentication.
Each of the 15 SSSL participants was given and asked to
remember a 5 digit random PIN from {1, . . . , 9}5. At the end,
each participant was asked to complete a short questionnaire
about the SSSL scheme.
To make the experiment scalable and to enable easier
data collection, we implemented the SSSL method as a web
application. Figure 2 shows the web interface used in the
evaluation of the SSSL method (Section III). Each participant
in the experiment had to sign in to the web page prior to
performing any SSSL login. For each participant, we recorded
different information such as the overall login time, the login
error rate, etc. These information have been stored into a
database for later processing.
As can be seen in Figure 2, in our implementation of SSSL
the user (participant) himself/herself initiate the transfer of
a random challenge by clicking on the “Challenge” button.
Each time the participant clicks the “Challenge” button and/or
enters a response via the response buttons the system (the
participant’s browser) logs the current time. This information
is then transmitted to a central server that stores it in the
appropriate data base for later processing. It is important to
emphasize that a participant has two alternatives when entering
his SSSL response. The user either uses a mouse and clicks on
the appropriate response button or he/she enters the response
directly via a keyboard. It turned out that while using a
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Fig. 3. The PIN-entry time: evaluation results from the experiment with 15
SSSL users for 5-digit PIN.
keyboard is a faster alternative, most of the participants still
preferred to use a mouse.
In the next subsection, we present and discuss the results
obtained in this experiment.
B. Evaluation Results
In Figure 3, we plot actual login times for the 15 PIN-
entry participants, as well as the the average login time (over
the 15 participants) for 4 consecutive weeks. Here, we take
into account only successful logins. The results in Figure 3
reveal two important facts about the SSSL method. First, it has
a very steep learning curve, but in a positive sense. Indeed,
the login time quickly decreases already after the first few
days of the experiment. Second, the overall login time is very
short, only 8 seconds on average at the end of the experiment.
The fastest PIN entry time was around 3.5 seconds. These
two facts about the SSSL scheme are a direct consequence
of its simplicity. The SSSL method does not involve mentally
demanding (mathematical) operations on the side of the human
user. Moreover, entering 5 digits requires only 5 challenge-
response rounds.
Figure 4(a) shows an average PIN-entry error rate for the
period of 21 consecutive logins organized into 3 equal periods.
The participants performance improves significantly from the
first to the second period, where it drops to about 7% error
rate (1 error in 14 logins).
In Figure 4(b), we show the average response time for a
single PIN-entry participant. The response time is defined as
the time it takes to the user to hear the challenge and in turn
to enter his/her response. As can be seen from this figure,
the observed participant spent on average 1 second per PIN
digit. It is interesting to note that this participant has chosen
to use a keyboard for entering SSSL responses. As we already
noted, a keyboard is a much faster alternative compared to a
mouse. Nevertheless, most of the participants have chosen to
use mouse in the experiment. The average response time over
all participants is around 1.6 seconds.
Figure 4(b) reveals another interesting fact about SSSL (and
other cognitive authentication methods): the response time is a
U
(a)
1 3 5 7 9
(b)
Fig. 4. a) The average PIN-entry error rate (%) for 15 users for 21 consecutive
logins divided into 3 periods. b) Histogram showing the user’s response time
for different challenge values and the PIN digit 7.
TABLE I
THE TABLE SUMMARIZES THE QUESTIONNAIRE FROM 15 PARTICIPANTS
PROVIDED AT THE END OF THE STUDY.
Time to enter a 5-digit PIN
Grades 1 2 3 4 5
Participants number 4 5 6 0 0
Easy to learn
Answers Y Y/N N
Participants number 11 4 0
Use in high-security situations
Answers Y N
Participants number 15 0
function of a challenge value. We will discuss some important
implications of this fact in Section V.
Questionnaire. At the end of our study, students were
asked to complete a short questionnaire about the SSSL.
The participants were asked to rate the ease-of-use and learn
of SSSL. From 15 users, 11 of them answered that our
method was easy to learn and use. The others answered with
moderately hard(i.e., YES/NO).
The participants were also asked to rate the authentication
times (from 1 − 5, 1-acceptable, 5-slow). Recall, students
had two alternatives when entering SSSL response, via a
mouse or via a keyboard. The participants who used the
keyboard achieved smaller total times, and answered 1 or
2. On the other hand the participants who used the mouse
rated with 2 or 3. They were also asked to comment the
experience of the SSSL scheme. Some of them answered that
was “fun”, “novel”, they felt more “secure”, 3 users noted
that took them several logins to learn using keyboard, but
afterwards it was easier to use. Table I summarizes the answers
from 15 participants. Participants preferred a mouse for the
SSSL response because it required no additional learning,
as opposite to the keyboard, although the scenario with a
keyboard achieved faster authentication times.
Finally, the participants agreed they would use SSSL in
places which require higher security, like bank transactions
or in public places.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we assess the security of the SSSL method
in different attacking scenarios and in the face of different
threats (timing attacks, key-loggers, fake ATMs).
PERKOVIĆ et al.: SSSL: SHOULDER SURFING SAFE LOGIN 69
A. Camera-Recording (Passive) Adversary
A camera-recording adversary will attempt to learn SSSL-
protected PINs and passwords by simply recoding the SSSL
login procedure. In this adversarial model the attacker is
passive and does not interact in any way with the system that
a user tries to authenticate to.
Let us first consider the case in which challenge values re-
main unknown to the adversary during the course of an attack;
later on we discuss likely attacks directed at the protected
channel used for delivering secret challenges to the user. Let d,
c and r denote the secret PIN digit, the secret challenge value
and the public response, respectively. Moreover, let d = 4,
c = 9 and hence r = ⇓ (see Figure 1(a)). The question
that we ask ourself here is: What does the attacker learn by
observing the response r = ⇓?
Assuming that d and c remain secret, all that the attacker
can learn by observing the response r = ⇓ is that it has been
generated by one of the following nine (d, c) pairs:
d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
c 6 4 5 9 7 8 3 1 2
r ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
As both d and c are selected uniformly at random from
{1, . . . , 9}, each of the pairs (d, c) above is equally likely to
be the true pair. In other words, the adversary learns nothing
about the true secret PIN digit d. The same argument applies
to any response r.
Eavesdropping on the protected channel. In an attempt
to break the SSSL scheme, the attacker could try to at-
tack the protected “challenge” channel. For example, the
adversary could try to use a parabolic reflector to collect
sound energy produced by earphones through which the user
receives challenges. This threat can be mitigated by reducing
sufficiently the volume level of an audio challenge. More
advanced protection would involve sound and noise reduction
techniques. In-ear monitors are a passive counterpart to active
noise canceling headphones [7]. They offer portability similar
to earbuds, and also act as earplugs to block out environmental
noise. According to [1], canalphones may reach isolation levels
of -30dB to -40dB, which implies a lower sound level of an
audio challenge. Laser beam eavesdropping [16] is another
potential threat. Canalpohones can mitigate this threat too.
For additional protection, the user can simply cover his/her
earphone with a hand.
It is interesting to note that in a recent work [6] Halperin et
al. propose an audio channel to securely transfer key between
an implantable cardioverter defibrillator and an external de-
vice (programmer).
B. Side-Channel Timing Attacks
A classic timing attack is a side channel attack in which
an attacker attempts to compromise a given cryptosystem by
analyzing the time it takes to execute different cryptographic
operations [11]. In this section, we analyze the possibility
of reducing the entropy of PINs and passwords by simply
observing the user’s reaction time during the SSSL procedure.
This is a similar approach to [28] where Zhuang, Zhou
4 6 5 4 8
7 3 8 2 7
Fig. 5. Patterns showing different response times (∆t) by two users with
PINs: 46548 and 73827.
and Tygar propose to reconstruct unknown text (a password)
by recording keyboard acoustic emanations produced by the
user’s typing. In this section, we show that the timing attack
does present a threat against the SSSL login method. We
conjecture this to be the case with any cognitive authentication
method that involves the human user.
We consider the passive attacker with the capability to
record the user’s reaction time during the course of the SSSL
procedure. To accomplish this, the attacker can for example
use any standard key-logging malware. The attacker records
the user’s reaction time (∆t), that is, the time period from
the time instant tc at which the user receives the challenge
value to the time instant (tr) at which the user enters his/her
response. Speaking mathematically, ∆t = tc−tr. In our initial
implementation of SSSL, the user himself/herself initiates the
transfer of a challenge value by clicking on the “Challenge”
(Figure 2). Therefore, the attacker can easily record the time
tc; the same applies to tr.
In Figure 5, we plot the response time ∆t for two SSSL
users from our evaluation study (Section IV). The patterns
in Figure 5 are generated as follows. For each user we
recorded 30 successful logins and for each successful login
we calculated the response time ∆t taken for entering a given
PIN digit. Recall that for a given PIN digit, the response
time is a function of a random challenge (Figure 4(b)). Since
there are only 9 different challenge values and we recorded
30 login sessions, each challenge value has been generated
approximately 3 times on average for the fixed PIN digit. Next,
we average these response times for the fixed PIN digit and
each different challenge value. Note that the attacker can do
the same, since the same PIN digit and the same challenge
value always imply the same public response by the user.
These 9 average response times are stored in a 3×3 matrix to
which we applied the MATLAB functions contour() and
shading() [10] to finally obtain the patterns as shown in
Figure 5. Darker area means the shorter response time.
By analyzing the patterns in Figure 5 an adversary can
extract significant amount of information about the secret
PINs. For example, for the first user the attacker can observe
that patterns corresponding to the first and the fourth PIN digit
are highly correlated. Similarly, for the second user, there is
a very high correlation between the first and the last PIN
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digit. Based on this information, the attacker can conclude
that the respective PIN digits are the same, therefore reducing
the security factor from 95 to 94 (i.e., approximately 89%!).
In order to mitigate this threat, we can apply standard
techniques such as introducing random delays in the SSSL
challenge-response procedure. The price that we have to pay
for this is the increased login time by a few seconds. Note that
we can afford this extra time, as the overall login time with
SSSL is reasonably short.
It is important to emphasize that the timing attack threat is
not specific of SSSL. It is common any cognitive authentica-
tion scheme that involves the human user.
C. Active Attacks
In this section we show how to harden SSSL against this
threat in a way that is completely transparent to the user.
We consider a very powerful attacker. Thus, the attacker can
trick the user to login from a compromised computer or ATM
that are under the attacker’s control. Clearly, all login methods
described in Section II, including our SSSL, can be easily
broken in such a model. A safe way to protect against such
attacks is to completely bypass the compromised machine. The
problem however is how to accomplish this in a user-friendly
and cost efficient way?
A possible approach based on SSSL applies to scenarios
where an end-server authenticates the user who is connected
to the server through a potentially compromised machine. A
typical scenario is that of an on-line ATM, where the ATM
is connected over the Internet to the secure bank server. We
assume that the end-server is not compromised. As before,
we assume that the user receives challenges over earphones
(canalphones). The only difference is that now challenges
come from the end-server. By integrating a tamper resistant
microprocessor capable of performing cryptographic opera-
tions, the user and the secure end-server can completely by-
pass, for example, a compromised ATM. Indeed, the hardened
earphones and the bank server will share a secret key that will
be used to ensure the confidentiality and the integrity of SSSL
challenges. Note that during the user authentication phase, the
intermediate ATM will only provide the connectivity between
the user and the bank server.
This solution is completely transparent to the user who
simply follows the basic SSSL login procedure. Should the
attacker tamper with cryptographically protected challenges,
the hardened earphones will detect this and discard them.
What is more, earphones hardened with a tamper resistant
microprocessor can replace a tamper resistant smart card in the
ATM scenario without affecting at all the two-factor authenti-
cation. Actually, by combining the SSSL method and hardened
earphones we implement the two-factor authentication that
is cost-efficient, user-friendly and safe against shoulder
surfing attacks.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF SSSL
The SSSL PIN-entry method is a software-based solution
and, as such, can easily be integrated into existing systems
that require users to type in some secret value. For example, in
this section, we show the advantages of integrating SSSL into
smart-card readers (in Internet banking systems) and ceratin
types of secure tokens (e.g., SSL/TLS enabled USB sticks).
SSSL in Internet Banking. The strongest authentication
model in the context of Internet banking is the one where
the user authenticates each transaction by “signing” it with
his/her private key [8]. For this, the user is equipped with a
smart card (e.g., JavaCard) and a secure online card reader
(e.g., FINREAD). The smart card hosts the user’s private
keys (for signing and authentication) plus some certificates,
while the online reader allows the user to access “securely”
to his/her private key and to perform signing operations. A
card reader must have certain physical properties such as,
tamper resistance, a secure display, and a secure keypad.
The sole purpose of a secure keypad is to allow the user
to securely enter his/her PIN. Tamper resistance of course
increases significantly the overall cost of the reader.
(a) Classical smart card reader.
(b) SSSL-enabled smart card reader.
Fig. 6. Application of SSSL to smart card readers in Internet banking
systems.
Here we show that SSSL can replace a secure keypad in the
above Internet banking model, in such a way that the security
of the original architecture is not affected. In this way, we can
basically halve the size of the original card reader as shown in
Figure 6, which also reduces the overall cost of a tamper-proof
reader.
In the architecture shown in Figure 6(b), the user will
receive SSSL challenges on the reader’s display. This design
choice is motivated by the following observation. When en-
tering his/her PIN over a secure keypad on a card reader,
the user’s typing can be easily recorded unless he/she covers
the keypad. In the same way, the user can cover the reader’s
secure display when receiving SSSL challenges. The overall
odds of the camera recording attacker are the same in both
architectures shown in Figure 6.
The SSSL challenges ci will be generated by the reader,
while the user will enter his/her response ri using the mouse or
the keyboard of the computer to which the reader is connected
(Figure 6(b)). When the user enters his/her response, the
computer will simply forward it back to the card reader. Since
SSSL challenges remain unknown to the computer, it cannot
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learn the PIN entered by the user (Section III).
By cutting the size and hence the cost of expensive smart-
card readers, we can effectively stimulate wider adoption of
such advanced security solutions.
“SSL/TLS+SSSL”-enabled Security Tokens. As a software-
based solution, SSSL can be easily integrated with secure
tokens such as SSL/TLS enabled USB sticks. In this way, we
enable the user to establish a secure tunnel from practically
any public machine without the fear of revealing his/her secret
login credentials. Similarly, many existing solutions require the
user to enter a master secret to unlock his/her USB security
token. The user enters the master secret on a computer on
which the token is being used, thus exposing the master secret
to different forms of observation attacks. With SSSL enabled
security tokens, this threat is successfully mitigated.
VII. CONCLUSION
We made several contributions in this paper. The fact
that many prominent cognitive authentication methods are
vulnerable to some form of a SAT-solver attacks, motivated
our approach to the design of a secure login method.
First, we proposed a novel PIN-entry scheme called Shoul-
der Surfing Safe Login (SSSL). Compared to existing solutions,
SSSL is both user-friendly and cost-efficient. In spite of the
fact that SSSL is originally developed as a PIN-entry method,
we showed that it can be also easily adapted to work with
graphical passwords.
Second, we carried out an experiment involving 15 partici-
pants, with the goal of studying usability aspects of SSSL. Our
study confirmed that the proposed SSSL method is extremely
easy to learn and use. The average login time with SSSL is
only 8 seconds.
Third, we showed that a hardened version of SSSL can
thwart strong active attacks in a way that is completely
transparent to the user. Moreover, we showed that the threat
of side-channel timing attacks has to be considered seriously
in the context of cognitive authentication schemes. Finally, we
showed in Section VI a number of advantages of integrating
SSSL into systems like Internet banking and secure USB
tokens.
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